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QUESTION FOR REVIEW
WAS IT REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO
REFUSE TO ADMIT EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT DRIVER FLED THE
SCENE AFTER STRIKING PLAINTIFF PEDESTRIAN?

REFERENCE TO COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at
Fisher v. Trapp, 73 Utah Adv. Rpt. 105 (January 7, 1988).

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The decision being reviewed was entered on January
7, 1988.

Appellant's Petition for Rehearing was filed on

January 21, 1988; the petition was denied on February 1,
1988.
Jurisdiction in this court is provided by Utah
Code Ann. §78-2-2(5) (amended 1986).

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
The Utah authority most nearly determinative is
State v. Franklin, 7 35 P.2d 34 (Utah 1987); State v. Bales,
675 P.2d 573 (Utah 1983); State v. Simpson, 120 Utah 596,
236 P.2d 1077 (1951) .

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

;

1.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.
Fisherf

a

child

pedestrian,

defendant Trappfs vehicle struck him.
action for damages for his injuries.
a

jury, which

was

injured

when

Fisher brought this
The case was tried to

found Trapp not negligent.

The Court of

Appeals affirmed the judgment.

2.

Statement of Facts.
Trapp struck Fisher as he crossed Redwood Road on

foot.
later.

Trapp fled the scene, but returned a few minutes
He

left

the

shortly afterward.

scene

a

second

time, but

returned

Trapp spoke with a police officer, but

failed to admit that he was the driver who hit Fisher*
Trapp again left the scene and went home.

Later, his wife

convinced him to call the police and admit his involvement
in the accident.
At

an

in

camera

hearing

before

trial,

Trapp

admitted the foregoing facts (R. 270). His attorney argued
that Fisher should be barred from presenting evidence of
Trapp's
probative

hit-and-run.
value

of

The

trial

Trappfs

court

flight

found

was

outweighed by possible unfair prejudice.
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that

the

substantially

Fisher was unable to remember anything about the
accident because of his injuries (R. 303). Trapp testified
that he was paying proper attention to the road, (R. 298,
299).

Evidence of Trapp's hit-and-run was not admitted; a

jury found no cause of action.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD ISSUE TO
DETERMINE WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION IS INCONSISTENT WITH PRECEDENT
SET BY THIS COURT ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF "FLIGHT"
The Court of Appeals admitted that this court "has
not addressed whether evidence of flight from the scene of
an accident is admissible in a civil action for negligence."
(106).

However, this court has ruled on the admissibility

of flight evidence in recent criminal cases.

In State v.

Franklin, 735 P.2d 34 (Utah 1987), this court stated, "We
have previously ruled that evidence of flight is probative."
In State v. Bales, 675 P.2d

573 (Utah 1983), this court

noted, ". . .our cases affirm the admissibility of evidence
of flight [citations omitted]. . . ".

This court's decision

that evidence of flight is probative and admissible should
have been regarded as binding by the Court of Appeals.
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Bales found that "clear evidence of contemporaneous flight" is a sufficient factual foundation for admission
of

flight

evidence.

Fisher

offered

clear

evidence

of

contemporaneous flight through Trapp's own admission that he
fled the scene immediately following the accident.
Franklin

and

Bales, the evidence

probative and admissible.

of

Trapp's

The decision of

Under

flight was

the Court of

Appeals was contrary to precedents of this Court admitting
flight evidencec

POINT II
CERTIORARI SHOULD ISSUE SO
THAT THIS COURT CAN CORRECT THE
APPEARANCE OF SEPARATE RULES EVIDENCE
BETWEEN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES IN UTAH
The Court of Appeals distinguished Franklin and
Bales

on

context."

the

ground

However,

that
Utah

they
Rule

arose
of

"ftjhese rules govern proceedings
state.

. •".

"in

Evidence

the
101

criminal
states,

in the courts of this

The Advisory Committee Note adds that the

Rules of Evidence are "applicable in all instances in the
courts of this state."

The Rules do not hint that evidence

can be admissible in criminal cases, but not in civil cases.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
OCR, may
errors.
Rather, the Rules Machine-generated
contemplate
a contain
unitary
body of evidence.

The Court of Appeals' opinion apparently regards
evidence precedents set by this Court in criminal cases as
not binding on lower courts in civil cases.

If this error

is not corrected, great confusion will result.

No one will

ever know whether a criminal opinion relating to evidence
can be used in a civil trial, or vice versa.
certiorari
evidence

should
law

in

issue
Utah.

to

maintain

If

certiorari

a

In short,

single
does

body

not

of

issue,

evidence law in Utah may become polarized—that is, a body
of criminal evidence will develop, and a body of civil
evidence will develop.

(It is true that the burden of proof

differs in criminal and civil cases, but the law of evidence
does not change.)
In fairness, the Court of Appeals apparently felt
that criminal cases are somehow inherently different from
hit-and-run

auto accidents.

But any claimed

distinction

between flight evidence in an "action for negligence" and
"in the criminal context" completely collapses
cases

where

negligence

and

criminal

conduct

in those
overlap.

Criminal negligence cases involving auto accidents uniformly
admit evidence of post-accident flight.
For example, In State v. Pierce, 647 P.2d

847

(Mont. 1982), a hit-and-run drunk driver was convicted of
aggravated

assault

and criminal

negligence.
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The Montana

Supreme

Court

stated

"Flight

by

the

defendant

may

be

considered by the jury as a circumstance tending to prove
consciousness

of

guilt."

Id-

at 851.

Admissibility

of

flight was upheld even though the defendant admitted causing
the accident and even though there were ample witnesses.
Evidence of post-accident flight was also admitted
in the following cases?

Clay v. State, 128 A.2d 634 (Md.

1957)(prosecution

manslaughter

negligence;

for

defendant

admitted

he

based

caused

the

on

gross

accident);

State v. Humbolt, 562 P. 2d 123 (Kan. App. 1977)(involuntary
manslaughter conviction; admissible to show "consciousness
of guilt"); People v. Allen, 14 N.E.2d 397 (111. 1938)
(manslaughter based on wilful! and wanton negligence; defendant admitted to accident); State v. Achter, 445 SoWJd
318 (Mo. 1969)(evidence of post-accident flight considered
on issue of culpable

negligence).

Presumably,

the

same

dangers in admitting flight evidence exist in these criminal
cases as in civil cases.
The Court of Appeals' opinion contains the seeds
of a separate body of evidence law in civil cases.

A writ

of certiorari should issue to make clear that decisions of
this Court on evidence are binding, whether they appear in
civil or criminal cases.
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POINT III
CERTIORARI SHOULD ISSUE TO DECIDE
WHETHER UTAH SHOULD ADOPT A POSITION
CONTRARY TO THE VAST MAJORITY OF CIVIL CASES
WHICH ADMIT EVIDENCE OF POST-ACCIDENT FLIGHT
The Court of Appeals admitted the admission of
hit-and-run evidence is one of first impression in Utah.
The Court of Appeals stated that "some other jurisdictions,
.have

admitted

evidence

of

flight

in

civil

cases."

Actually, courts are nearly unanimous in admitting hit-andrun evidence.

State v. Ford,

146 A.

828

(Conn. 1929);

Vuillemot v. August J. Calverie & Co., 125 So. 168 (La.
1929); Greenwood v. Bailey, 184 So. 285 (Ala. 1938); Shaddy
v. Daley, 76 P.2d 279 (Id. 1938); Hallman v. Cushman, 13
S.E.2d 498 (So. Car. 1941); Petroleum Carrier Corporation v.
Snyder, 161 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1947)(applying Georgia law);
Brooks v. E.J. Willey Truck Transportation Co., 255 P.2d 801
(Cal.

1953); Harrington v. Sharff, 305 F.2d 333 (2nd Cir.

1962)(applying Vermont law); Dean v. Cole, 217 F.Supp. 280
(E.D. So. Car. 1963); Busbee v. Quassier, 172 So.2d 17 (Fla.
1965); Gaul v. Noiva, 230 A.2d 591 (Conn. 1957) Jones v.
Strelecki, 49 N.J. 513, 231 A.2d 558; Richards v. Office
Products,

380

N.E.2d

725

(Ohio App.

1977);

Johnson

v.

Austin, 280 N.W.2d 9 (Mich. 1979); Waycott v. Northeast Ins.
Co., 465 A.2d 854 (Me. 1983); Grzys v. Connecticut Co., 123
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Conn.

605, 198 A.

259

(1938); Shaddy v. Daley, supra. ;

Langenstein v. Reynaud, 13 La. App. 272, 127 So. 764 (1930);
Olofson v. Kilqallon, 291 N.E.2d 600 (Mass. 1973); Peterson
v. Henning, 452 N.E.2d 135 (111. App. 1983).
When

the

Court

of

Appeals

rejected

the

admissibility of flight evidence in civil cases, it adopted
what is very much a minority view.

The only case cited by

the Court of Appeals, Barnes v. Gaines, 668 P.2d 1175 (Okla.
App. 1983), involved a driver who stole the investigating
officer's car and then fled.

The Court of Appeals found

this to be "closely analogous" to Fisher's case.

In fact,

Barnes is the case least analogous on its facts to Fisher's
case.
The

Court

of

Appeals

attempted

to

distinguish

cases cited by Fisher by creating four special "reasons" to
admit flight.
denial

of

These special reasons (lack of eyewitnesses,

driver

involvement,

aggravation

of

injuries,

serious

factual disputes), do not appear

in any of the

cases.

Instead, Fisher's cases admit flight evidence to

show a defendant's consciousness of responsibility or guilt.
Brooks v. Willey Truck Trans. Co., supra. , 255 P.2d 801;
Grzys v. Connecticut Co., 123 Conn. 605, 198 A. 259 (1938);
Shaddy v. Daley, 76 P.2d

279

(Id. 1938); Langenstein v.

Raynaud, 13 La. App. 272, 127 So. 764 (1930).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Q

They admit

flight to create an inference of failing to keep a proper
lookout.

Jones v. Strelecki, 49 N.J. 513, 231 A.2d 558

(N.J. 1967); Busbee v. Quarrier, 172 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1965);
Vuillemot v. August J. Calverie
1929).

Co., 125 So. 168 (La.

Finally, they admit post-accident failure to stop to

evidence a wilfull, wanton or reckless state of mind at the
time of impact.

Hallman v. Cushman, 13 S.E.2d 498 (S.C.

1941); Richards v. Office Products Co., 380 N.E.2d 725 (Ohio
App. 1977); Dean v. Cole, 217 F.Supp. 280 (E.D.S.C. 1963).
The Court of Appeals made the statement that the
cases cited by Fisher did not admit evidence of postaccident flight to show negligence.

On the contrary, that

is the reason why 19 civil cases have admitted such evidence.
The Court of Appeals committed Utah to a position
rejected by the vast majority of courts.

A writ of certi-

orari should issue to ensure that Utah's position on the
issue is well considered.
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POINT IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN FINDING UNFAIR PREJUDICE
FROM FLIGHT EVIDENCE
The trial court found that the probative value of
evidence Trapp's hit-and-run was substantially outweighed by
unfair prejudice.

However, the trial court and the Court of

Appeals erred in finding unfair prejudice to Trapp.

The

only unfair prejudice identified by the Court of Appeals was
the danger that Trapp may have had an innocent explanation
for flight

("fear or remorse") which the jury might not

believe.
No other court has barred flight evidence on the
ground

that

explanation.

defendant

may

have

an

honest

or

innocent

Instead, it is "for the jury to say, under all

the circumstances, whether [defendant] departed because uf
his consciousness of guilt."
864, 865 (Iowa 1984).

State v. Brokaw, 342 N.W.2d

In other words, ". . .the existence

of explanations—other than consciousness of guilt of the
crime charged. . .is relevant to the weight of the evidence
of flight, but not to its admissibility."
499 P.2d 129, 139 (Cal. 1972).

People v. Perry,

See also, Comm. v> Toney,

433 N.E.2d 425 (Mass. 1982).
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A writ

of certiorari

should

issue

to consider

whether the decisions of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals

improperly

invade

the

province

of

the

jury

in

weighing flight evidence.

CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals' opinion would allow evidence
of flight if Trapp were being prosecuted for drunk driving,
but not when his innocent victim sues him.
unfair to victims of criminal conduct.

This rule is

Also, a trial court

trying a drunk driving or criminal negligence case would be
hard-pressed to decide whether to apply the auto accident
rule of Fisher or the criminal case rule of Franklin and
Bales.
The reality is that the same facts that support
criminal liability also give rise to civil liability.

Why

should balancing under Rule 403 of the same facts result in
admission in a criminal case, but not in a civil case?
The Court of Appeals found prejudice in the danger
that the jury will not believe other reasons the defendant
has for fleeing (p. 107). This same danger exists in every
criminal case (including Franklin and Bales).
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Why is the

danger

that

explanation

the
so

jury

will

compelling

discount

in

a

the

civil

defendant's

case,

yet

not

compelling in a criminal case?
The

rule

laid

down

in

the

Court

of

Appeals'

opinion is arbitrary and unfair to the victim in the civil
context.

It is contrary to the spirit and letter of prior

decisions of the Utah Supreme Court•

Thus, a substantial

inconsistency in precedent will result if the case is not
reviewed

by

this

Court.

It

creates

an

appearance

of

separate bodies of evidence law in criminal and civil cases.
A writ of certiorari should be granted.

DATED thisrr^>

day of 'YYl^dJl^Aj

, 1988.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Appellant
i

i

By: /
/ uij.i
>•
i i
DANIEL F .
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
-OOOOO

Joshua Fisher, by and through
his general guardian,
Carla Fisher,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

)
)
- )

OPINION
(For Publication)

)

Warren Trapp,

)

Case No. 860359-CA

)

Defendant and Respondent. )

FiI ^ ^
Before Judges Greenwood, Bench and Billings.
GREENWOOD, J u d g e :

* fL
» L« uJ
JAN
011383
Tamc.w/ M S ^
Cert of &e Con*
Utah Court o* A£ •>*#•$

Plaintiff, Joshua Fisher (Fisher), initiated this action
against defendant, Warren Trapp (Trapp),•after a
pedestrian-automobile accident. The jury found no cause of
action, and Fisher appeals, claiming that the trial judge erred
in excluding evidence that defendant fled the scene of the
accident. We affirm.
At about 9:15 p.m. on June 3, 1982, Trapp hit Fisher
while Trapp was driving north on Redwood Road in Salt Lake
City. As Trapp approached 430 North on Redwood Road, Fisher,
age nine, and his brother, Patrick Fisher, age twelve, were
standing on the west side of the street waiting to cross.
Fisher darted across Redwood Road and collided with the left
front wheel area of Trapp's vehicle, landing about one foot
from where the collision occurred.
Following the collision, Trapp continued northbound, but
returned to the accident site within a few minutes and saw an
adult aiding Fisher. Trapp again left, returned shortly
thereafter, and spoke to a police officer without identifying
himself as the driver of the vehicle. Trapp then went to his
home, and within thirty minutes of the accident, called the
police and identified himself as the driver of the vehicle that
had hit Fisher.
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At trial, the two eyewitnesses to the accident, Fisher's
brother, Patrick, and Trapp, testified. Fisher did not testify
because he had no recollection of the accident. Patrick
testified that he and Fisher were walking down Redwood Road
when Fisher turned to cross the street in the middle of the
block. Patrick said Fisher waited for three cars and then
started crossing* Patrick saw the Trapp vehicle and yelled at
Fisher as he ran into the road. Fisher turned back, looked
like he was trying to come back and was then hit by the front
left portion of Trapp's car,, Patrick ran to his brother, told
him to lie still and ran to a house where he was told that an
ambulance had been called. Trapp testified that he first knew
an accident had occurred when he heard a thump and
simultaneously saw Fisher at the left front fender of his car.
Prior to trial, Trapp filed a motion in limine to exclude
evidence that he failed to stop at the scene of the accident.
Fisher contended the evidence was admissible to create an
inference of defendant's consciousness of guilt. The judge
excluded the evidence on the ground that its possible
prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.
During the trial, Val Shupe, an accident reconstruction
expert, was called as a witness by Fisher to elicit his opinion
of the cause of the accident. Trapp's objection to the
testimony, based on inadequate foundation, was sustained.
Later in the trial, after additional foundation was laid, Shupe
was permitted to state his opinion of the cause of the accident.
Fisher claims on appeal that the trial court committed
reversible error by: 1)' excluding evidence concerning Trapp's
flight from the scene o£ the accident; and 2) excluding Shupe°s
testimony.
I.
We first consider whether evidence that Trapp left the
scene of the accident was properly excluded. The trial court's
rulings regarding the admissibility of evidence will not be
disturbed unless it clearly appears that the lower court was in
error. State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986).
According to Utah R. Evid. 401, evidence is relevant if
it has Many tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
However, relevant evidence may be excluded if "its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury
. . . .w Utah R. Evid. 403.
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Evidence is unfairly prejudicial . . . if
it has a tendency to influence the outcome
of the trial by improper means, or if it
appeals to the jury's sympathies, or
arouses its sense of horror, provokes its
instinct to punish or otherwise causes a
jury to base its decision on something
other than the established propositions of
the case.
Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314, 323 n.31
(Utah 1979).
The Utah Supreme Court has not addressed whether evidence
of flight from the scene of an accident is admissible in a civil
action for negligence.1 However, some other jurisdictions
confronted with the issue have admitted evidence of flight in
civil cases. Evidence of flight has been admitted where the
plaintiff's injuries were aggravated by the driver's failure to
stop and render assistance. Brooks v. Willig Truck Transp. Co,,
40 Cal.2d 669, 255 P.2d 802 (1953) (trial court did not err in
instructing jury on the duty to stop and use reasonable care to
prevent further injury where plaintiff's injuries were aggravated
by defendant's failure to stop and render assistance); Hallman v.
Cushman, 13 S.E.2d 498, 499-501 (S.C. 1941) (where defendant fled
accident and flight may have aggravated plaintiff's injuries, no
prejudicial error in instructing jury that flight evidence could
be considered on punitive damages issue only after it was proven
1. The Utah Supreme Court has, however, addressed the
admissibility of flight evidence in the criminal context. State
v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34 (Utah 1987); State v. Bales, 675 P.2d
573 (Utah 1983); State v. Simpson, 120 Utah 596, 236 P.2d 1077
(1951). In Franklin, the Court held, in a murder prosecution,
that evidence of defendant's flight from custody was not
erroneously admitted where the trial judge gave a cautionary
instruction warning the jury not to give too much weight to the
mere fact of flight without carefully considering the other
motives, besides guilt, that may have influenced defendant. In
Bales, the Utah Supreme Court stated that it was error to
instruct the jury that flight from the scene of a crime
constitutes an implied admission of guilt and that a flight
instruction -will not be completely free from criticism unless it
advises the jury that there may be reasons for flight fully
consistent with innocence and that even if consciousness of guilt
is inferred from flight it does not necessarily reflect actual
guilt of the crime charged." Bales, 675 P.2d at 575. Under the
reasoning in these two cases, it appears that, at least in
criminal cases, evidence of flight is circumspectly admitted and,
if admitted, must be accompanied by specific instructions.
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that defendant's vehicle was involved). Other courts have
indicated that such evidence is admissible where the driver
denied involvement in the accident. Dean v. Cole, 217 F. Supp.
280 (E.DJS.C. 1963) (evidence was sufficient to establish that
defendant's automobile proximately caused the pedestrian's
death where defendant admitted owning the vehicle involved in
t$e accident but did not recall what he did on the night of the
-accident); Busbee v. Ouarrier, 172 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1965)
(evidence, including evidence that the front grill of
defendant's vehicle had been dented and that defendant fled the
scene of the accident, supports jury's verdict that driver's
negligence proximately caused death of boy who was hit from the
rear while riding his bicycle).
In some cases, courts have admitted evidence of flight
where there were serious factual disputes in the evidence.
Petroleum Carrier Corp, v. Snyder, 161 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1947)
(where testimony was in dispute as to whether driver left the
scene of the accident, instruction on flight proper); Shaddv
v. Dalev, 58 Idaho 536, 76 PG2d 279, 282 (1938) (where there
were disputed facts regarding whether defendant stopped at the
accident scene, evidence of flight admissible). In addition,
some courts have admitted evidence that defendant fled the
scene of the accident where there were no eyewitnesses to the
accident. Johnson v. Austin, 406 Mich. 420, 280 N.W.2d 9
(1979) (where circumstances of accident unknown, evidence of
flight gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that driver was
at fault); Busbee, 172 So. 2d at 17*
None of the cases cited admitted flight evidence for the
purpose of proving defendant's alleged negligence, as Fisher
attempted, nor do their underlying reasoning support its
Admission in this case. Trapp's flight from the scene of the
accident did not aggravate Fisher's injuries since a neighbor
called an ambulance immediately after the accident. In
addition, flight evidence was not necessitated by significant
factual disputes or the absence of eyewitness testimony. Both
Trapp and Patrick Fisher testified regarding the accident and
their testimony did not conflict. Finally, evidence that Trapp
fled the scene of the accident was not required to demonstrate
that Trapp was the driver of the vehicle. Trapp contacted the
police within thirty minutes of the accident and admitted that
he was the driver of the vehicle that hit Fisher.
Flight evidence has been excluded in other cases which
more closely parallel this case. In Freeman v. Anderson, 279
Ark. 282, 651 S.W.2d 450 (1983), flight evidence was found
inadmissible as a basis to demonstrate wilful and wanton
conduct required for an award of punitive damages. Freeman
also reiterated the finding of an earlier case, that "failure
of a driver to comply with the law requiring him to give his
name, license number, etc. and render assistance to the
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operator or persons injured in the other car had no bearing on
the cause of the collision, and, therefore, the trial court
properly refused to give an instruction on that matter." Id,
at 452. ^Similarly, in Clark v. Mask, 232 Miss. 65, 98 So. 2d
467 (1957), the court found that a presumption or inference of
negligence does not arise from defendant's failure to stop at
the scene of an accident in contravention of a statutory duty
to do so, as the statutory duty applies to non-negligent as
well as negligent persons. Lastly, in Barnes v. Gaines, 668
P.2d 1175 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983), the court reviewed the trial
court's admission of evidence that defendant stole a police car
and fled the scene after an automobile collision. The court
found that such evidence was not relevant to issues of
negligence or plaintiffs damages
or any other fact of consequence to the
determination of the primary action
between the parties* We, therefore, hold
that the admission of evidence of the
crime of stealing the police car after the
accident . . . was error because it
substantially affected the right of
defendant Gaines to a fair trial on the
primary issues before the jury. The
probative value of the evidence was
substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice . . . .
Id. at 1179.
We find in this case, as in Barnes, that Trapp's flight
from the scene of the accident had little, if any, relevance to
Fisher's claim of negligence. In addition, even if the
evidence were relevant, its probative value was overwelmingly
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Trapp's flight
could have indicated fear or remorse just as easily as
consciousness of guilt. Had the evidence been admitted, it
could have confused or misled the jury. When the marginal
relevance of the evidence is coupled with the potential
prejudicial effect the evidence of flight may have had upon the
jury, we believe the trial court acted well within its
discretion in excluding the evidence.
II.
Fisher's second claim on appeal is that the trial court
erred in excluding Shupe's opinion as to the cause of the
accident. During the trial, Fisher's attorney attempted to
elicit Shupe's opinion that Trapp was driving too fast and had
an improper lookout. Trapp's attorney successfully objected,
based on inadequate foundation, claiming that Shupe, an
accident reconstruction expert, had not testified as to the
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location on the road where Trapp could have seen Fisher and
taken steps to avoid the accident. On the second day of trial,
Shupe testified that during the recess he had returned to the
scene of, the accident and asked Patrick Fisher where he and the
Trapp vehicle were positioned when he first saw the vehicle.
Shupe then stated that Trapp was 201 feet from Fisher when
Fisher entered the road. Based on that foundation, the court
permitted Shupe to state that, in his opinion, Trapp was
proceeding too fast for the conditions and had an improper
lookout.
The trial court's determination of adequate foundation is
solely within the discretion of the trial court. Tias v.
Proctor, 591 P.2d 438, 440 (Utah 1979); see also Craio Food
Indus, v. Weihincr, 71 Utah Adv. Rep. 46, 47 (Utah App* 1987),
According to Utah R. Evid. 705, "[t]he expert may testify in
terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons therefor
without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data,
unless the court requires otherwise.- Further, H[t]he
admissibility of accident reconstruction evidence depends in
large measure upon the foundation laid* The expertise of the
witness, his degree of familiarity with the necessary facts,
and the logical nexus between his opinion and the facts adduced
must be established." Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328,
1331 (Utah 1979).
In this case, the trial court sustained Trapp's objection
to Shupees opinion because Shupe did not have the necessary
degree of familiarity with the facts. On the second day of
trial, when Shupe had acquired the requisite familiarity, the
judge allowed the testimony. Based on the facts present in
this case, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial judge.
Affirmed.

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Russell W. Bench, Judge

Judith M. Billings, Judge
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(Proceedings held in chambers.)

3

THE COURT:

We f re on the record now.

4

MR. HEATH:

The evidence will show in this case

5

that after the accident occurred that Mr. Trapp, the Defen-

6

dant in this case, continued to drive North for a distance,

7

and then turned around and came back to the scene of the

8

accident.

9

caring

10
11

At that time there was an adult who was there

for

the injured boy.

He then left the area, came back again, talked
to a police officer, still did not identify himself as the

12 driver of the car, and then went home and called the police
13 and advised them at that time that he was the driver of
14 the car within approximately 30 minutes of the accident.
15 I'm not sure of the exact time, but that had noen the best:
16 estimate that we have.
17

We believe the fact that he may have left the

18 scene of the accident, technically the statute says you
19 have a duty to render assistance if you can and to report
20 an accident.

We take the position that, in fact, when he

21 came back and saw that there was an adult there rendering
22 assistance, he's not a paramedic and so forth and has no
23 knowledge of medicine.
24 else.

He couldn't have offered anything

And the fact he later reported it, that: he satisfied

25 the statute.
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1

There was a charge to which he pled no contenda,

2 I which was ultimately dismissed.
3I

I don't t h i n k — l e t me represent, Les Richardson,

4

and I talked to Mr. Richardson, I think all the facts that

5

happened after the accident are immaterial tc how the

6

accident happened.

7

a motion nt this time that all the witnesses be

8

not to go into anything that would tend to indicate that

9

Mr. Trapp left the scene of the accident for these reasons.

10
11

And I would make a motion and do make

One, it's immaterial.
how the accident

12

instructed

It has nothing to do with

happened.

And two, that it would be highly prejudicial

13 to the jury, when we introduce prejudicial information

that

14 would deny him a right to a fair trial.
15

MR. HANSEN:

16

MR. HEATH:

Do you have any Utah cases on that?
.£ /think, it goes on the basis of just

17 evidentiary matters that it happened after, and it's not
18|admissible.
19

MR. HANSEN:

I have three cases.

They are not

20 Utah cases.
21

THE COURT:

22

MR. HANSEN:

All right.
I don ! t think anything should be

23 said about the criminal charges.

But it's certainly

24 permissible inferences under the hopings of those three
25 cases.

They 1 re not terribly recent.
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1

THE COURT:

Let me see if I understand.

Are

2

you Taking the position as I read your Complaint, at least

3

the Complaint alleged that his injuries may have been

*

aggravated or something?

5 |
6

MR. HANSEN:
that.

7

THE COURT:

8 I

MR. HANSEN:

9
10

We don't really have any proof of

Any evidence?
The time was pretty quick that he

got medical attention, and so we do not really claim anything for that.

11

THE COURT:

So you're claiming the fact he didn't

12

stop may have an inference of almost like an admission of

13

guilt?

14
15

MR. HANSEN:
inference.

Right.

That f s a permissible

It's certainly not conclusive, and we shouldn't

16 'say anything about the criminal aspect of the thing.

But

17 I any course of conduct which afterwards explains a prior
18 j mental state of mind, certainly would be.
19

MR. HEATH:

I'll submit the matter.

20

THE COURT:

Well, it seems to be something that

21

could inflame the jury a little bit.

I have some problems

22

with it.

23

was aggravated, it clearly would be relevant.

24

a hard

25

that occurred after the accident.

I think if there was some evidence that the injury
But I have

> ime seeing how, how it really bears on anything
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1

MR. HANSEN:

Well, Your Honor, our position is

2

that^there's two specific acts of negligence on behalf of

3

the Defendant driver.

*

One, that he-was driving too fast

for existing

5 I circumstances, and second, that he failed to keep "a proper
6

1 o<) k on! .

7

Now, I think his own conduct

is — speaks

louder

3

than words as to what he was doing.

He says in his depc—

9

sit ion, answered the questions, he didn't see this boy before

10

the actual time of impact.

But I t h i n k — I

think that we

11

can't--we ought not to be limited to that.

If under the

^2

theory of these cases that his conduct is something

13

which a reasonable inference can be drawn to show his state

14

of mind at the time of impact of a feeling of guilt, that

15

he contributed to that accident.

16

THE COURT:

Boy, I don't think so.

from

I think the

17 prejudicial effect of that outweighs the probative value.
18

I think the probative value is very limited.

19

going to grant the motion in limine, ask you to tell your

20

witnesses not to talk about those kinds of things.

21
22
23

MR. HEATH:

I think

I'm

May I mention the way it could come

up.
One would b e , it's my understanding that

Patrick

24

Fisher, the older brother, who was with the victim, was

25

insensed by the fact that the driver didn't stop and
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